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I T 1s ALWAYS SAID," observed Richelieu in his Testament politique, "that money forms the sinews of the state." 1 Most historians of 
early modern France would agree. "Absolutism was, in large part, the 
child of the fisc," notes one influential essay on early modern France, 
and a chorus of recent works repeats the same refrain.2 Fiscal crises, 
it seems, provoked nearly every change in the French political system 
from the Hundred Years War to the Revolution; and the tax system 
brings into sharper focus than any other facet of the French state both 
the limits of absolutism and the peculiar nature of liberty in France. 
To speak of the limits of absolutism may of course seem self 
contradictory, particularly in the case of the kings of France, who 
have usually been considered models of unconstrained power, able to 
judge, to legislate, and to tax at will. But in practice absolutism was 
hemmed in on all sides. To begin with, any king, even a Louis XIV, 
could only tax the wealth available in his country: he could not take 
what his subjects did not have. In France the wealth available was 
by and large land-some 464,000 square kilometers at the end of the 
sixteenth century, and 514,000 a century later. The king's subjects-
roughly 8 million in 1440, 16 million in 1560 and 1600, and 27 mil-
lion at the end of the Old Regime-by and large tilled the soil. It is 
estimated that 73 percent of them worked in agriculture in 1500, a 
figure that fell only slightly in the next two centuries: to 69 percent 
in 1600 and to 63 percent in 1700. In England and the Netherlands, 
by contrast, a smaller fraction of the population seems to have been 
engaged in agriculture, at least by 1700. In that year, only 55 per-
cent of the English farmed and only 40 percent of the Dutch did so. 
The gap was even wider in the late eighteenth century.3 The differ-
ence reflected lower agricultural productivity in France, a different 
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crop mix, and less urbanization; and it squeezed state finances, for 
with a smaller fraction of the population involved in trade, the fisc 
had to lean more heavily on the land. In the first half of the seven-
teenth century, for instance, before Colbert's fiscal reforms, taxes on 
trade provided less than 26 percent of the monarch's revenue, and the 
figure could drop to 16 percent during periods of war .4 
Other, more daunting obstacles also restricted the revenue from 
the taxation of trade. Urban tax exemptions, we shall see, allowed 
powerful merchants to escape taxation; and even in the absence of 
exemptions merchants were generally entitled to secrecy in their 
business dealings, so that their income remained hidden and difficult 
to tax. At the same time, the dispersion and the diversity of French 
commerce made excises and tariffs costly to levy. Paris after all did 
not dominate the kingdom's economy as London did England's, and 
even wine was not a staple as was English wool. Finally, the atomiza-
tion of the French economy restricted economic growth and reduced 
the amount of trade that could be taxed. France lacked highly devel-
oped internal waterways and the sort of interlinked network of cities 
one found in the Low Countries, and at least before the eighteenth 
century the economy resembled a congeries of lilliputian markets, 
each one primitive and isolated, as though the regions the markets 
served were separate countries.5 
As one might expect from such an economy, the French polity was 
splintered as well, with the fragmentation of the kingdom marking 
the limits of royal political power. The kings of France had assembled 
their realm by a process of accretion, adding provinces and cities from 
the Middle Ages into the eighteenth century. As they yoked terri-
tories to the kingdom, they confirmed traditional liberties and even 
conceded new privileges in order to win over a province or a city. 
When the strategic port of Bordeaux returned to French rule in the 
last stages of the Hundred Years War, for example, Charles VII granted 
the inhabitants tax exemptions and considerable local political au-
tonomy. The Crown gave equally generous privileges to organized 
elites, such as the nobility, whose political support remained essen-
tial; and it granted still others- assigning a municipal guild a local 
monopoly, for example-in order to facilitate the task of tax collec-
tion.6 The liberties that a king had granted or confirmed might later 
be circumvented, but even the most rapacious ruler would hesitate 
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before revoking customary privileges, particularly when he risked 
the wrath of mighty subjects. 
Powerful organizations also checked the monarch's powers. In 
over a dozen provinces, estates voted on truces; and everywhere sover-
eign law courts (among them were the parlements, the most impor-
tant one being the Parlement of Paris) could bend the king's will by 
refusing to register a royal edict. A court's refusal deprived an edict 
of legality and made it difficult to enforce. The Crown could force 
registration, but it then faced delays, ill will among the court's magis-
trates, and the obstruction of other le_gislation. Even a powerful king 
such as Louis XIV, who curtailed registration during the years 1673-
1715, did not really ride roughshod over the parlements.7 
The autonomy of royal agents further limited the king's freedom 
of action. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, judges and 
financial officials by and large owned their own offices, which they 
could buy and sell like private property. Many appointments thus es-
caped royal control. The governors, the Crown's provincial military 
commanders, also wielded considerable power over regional appoint-
ments. They could name army officers and royal officials, and they 
often pursued their own interests independently of the king. To lay 
a firmer hand on regional affairs, particularly those of the army and 
finances, the monarchy began to dispatch to the provinces a set of 
more reliable agents-the intendants. Sent out with revocable com-
missions, the intendants possessed extraordinary judicial and execu-
tive powers. The practice was systematized in the seventeenth cen-
tury, but despite their powers the intendants still had to seek the 
cooperation of local office holders and powerful elites. 
To eighteenth-century observers, and to many a modem histo-
rian, such a system of governance has appeared a hopeless muddle. 
Seemingly outmoded institutions-the parlements, the provincial 
estates, and a host of corporate groups-survived alongside the sleek 
new body of i.ptendants. Despite the absolute monarchy at the cen-
ter, each region possessed its own particularistic laws and customs, 
which the Crown itself had confirmed. Yet it would be a mistake 
to think that the hoary corporate institutions and the particularistic 
customs were merely vestigial survivals that the king ought to have 
swept away. They were integral to French political history, for to win 
the cooperation of powerful provincial elites, the Crown had granted 
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them corporate institutions-a Parlement, for example, or provincial 
estates-and confirmed their privileges and local customs. To main-
tain their cooperation, the Crown showered them with additional 
favors : pensions, patronage, discretion over government spending, or 
the favorable treatment of a legal appeal to the king's council. In a 
sense, the Crown became the dispenser of spoils and the sole arbiter 
of the frequent differences among the privileged groups, who gained 
more by cooperating with the monarch than by resisting or by set-
ting out on their own.8 
The Fiscal System 
The fiscal system provides the best illustration of how this curi-
ous polity worked and of what the limits to royal absolutism were. 
From an early date the tax system teemed with regional exceptions 
and privileges and spoils for elites. Consider, for example, the French 
nobility. When regular annual taxes not tied to a state of outright 
war began to be collected in France in the middle of the fourteenth 
century, nobles had ~o exemption. They paid as everyone else paid, 
although perhaps not so heavily. By the end of the century, how-
ever, they had escaped from taxation. During the reign of the weak 
and intermittently insane Charles VI, the Crown had to make con-
cessions to powerful noble factions, and among the concessions was 
the exemption from a new direct tax granted to nobles in 1388. In 
1393 the nobles got freedom from excise taxes levied on the produce 
from their own properties. The next king, Charles VII, was in no posi-
tion to antagonize the nobles and so he reaffirmed their exemptions.9 
They also benefited from the military employment that the taxes 
supported, and certain magnates pocketed a large share of royal taxa-
tion directly. 
Nor were the nobles unique. As the fisc grew, exemptions spread 
to all sorts of privileged individuals: magistrates, royal officers, and 
wealthy residents of cities. Only peasants and artisans-a majority 
of the population but unorganized and powerless-were not spared. 
Whole regions, as we noted above, escaped certain taxes by virtue of 
privileges that were accorded (or confirmed) upon their entry into the 
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realm. The list of the elites fattening at the public trough also grew. 
Besides the nobility, who benefited from military employment, pen-
sions, and control of patronage, there were the holders of government 
annuities (rentes ); the owners of government offices, whose inflated 
salaries (gages) depended on taxation; the financial officers, who bat-
tened on the rights they had to a share of the taxes they collected; 
and, mingling with them all, the semi-public financiers, who thrived 
by providing services for the fisc and by mobilizing the savings of the 
wealthy for the Crown.10 
The complexities of the fiscal system almost defy description, par-
ticularly since it changed considerably between the fourteenth and 
the seventeenth centuries. But at the risk of oversimplification, one 
can say that the French taxpayers paid direct taxes levied chiefly on 
land and income from land, although initially the direct taxes may 
have simply been a fixed sum per hearth. The best known of the direct 
taxes was the taille, but there were other related levies, such as the 
taillon, the crues, and the capitation . Taxpayers also owed indirect 
taxes: excise taxes on a bewildering variety of items, most notably 
wine; transit taxes for goods passing from one region of the kingdom 
to another; and a salt tax (the gabelle). 
Rights to collect a considerable portion of indirect taxes were 
sold to private tax farmers. The other taxes (chiefly direct taxation) 
were collected by the provincial estates or by royal officials known as 
elus. In certain provinces-in Languedoc, for example-the estates 
not only voted and collected taxes but also determined their form.11 
In other provinces, estates voted the taxes but the elus collected 
them. And in the areas that had long been part of the kingdom, the 
Crown imposed taxes without any vote by estates and the elus col-
lected them. 
If we consider the Crown's problems in the abstract, we can per-
haps make sense of certain features of the tax system, which many 
historians dismiss as irrational and incomprehensible.12 First, as we 
already know, the Crown had to make concessions to powerful elites 
and to new provinces. Hence the widespread exemptions in the tax 
system and the lack of uniformity. Hence too the elites' capturing 
the lion's share of tax revenues. In 1677 fully 33 percent of the taxes 
collected in Languedoc passed directly to local notables, and another 
19 percent was spent under their direction.13 
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A second problem stemmed from the high cost of assessing wealth 
in a country where few could read and where much of the wealth 
was in land and spread out over an enormous countryside. The mili-
tary engineer and tax reformer Vauban complained of the difficulties 
of judging the value of land and assessing a land tax at the beginning 
of the eighteenth century, and the obstacles were undoubtedly more 
severe in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.14 Because commerce 
was dispersed and heterogeneous, similar problems arose with levy-
ing excise and transit taxes. Widespread exemptions only aggravated 
matters: how did one stop cheap, untaxed salt from being smuggled 
into areas that paid a high price for salt because of the gabelle? 15 
Wealth, be it in land or in commerce, was therefore costly to assess; 
and taxes, both direct and indirect, were expensive to collect. And 
monitoring financial officials-to detect cheating, for example-
proved arduous. It was hard to determine whether a tax receiver was 
in arrears because of corruption or simply because a late harvest had 
delayed collections! 6 
In a vast country with primitive transportation and an atomized 
economy, the Crown also confronted the laborious task of moving 
money from place to place. Shipping coins to Paris was so costly that 
it was only attempted for provinces near Paris, and even then only 
a fraction was sent. In 1609, for example, only 20 percent of direct 
taxes collected were carted to Paris, and most of the shipments came 
from nearby Normandy. The distant generalite of Riom sent only o. 7 
percent of its take! 7 Most tax revenues were therefore spent locally. 
The king typically earmarked certain tax revenues for local salaries; 
in Languedoc, for example, he used the gabelle to pay the magistrates 
of the Parlement of Toulouse! 8 Other revenues were committed to 
regional military expenses or went to pay pensions to neighborhood 
magnates. Such local disbursements (known as assignations) were in 
fact the most common way for the Crown to pay all of its bills! 9 And 
since so much tax revenue was spent in the provinces, the monarchy 
had to wrestle control over its funds from local elites, who had their 
own ideas about how the money should be spent.20 The result was to 
reduce the portion of tax revenues at the king's disposal. 
When the Crown actually had to make payments in bullion-
when it had to support troops abroad, for example-it relied upon 
skilled bankers able to carry out the transfer of funds. Even here, 
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though, the bankers strived, whenever possible, to avoid the cumber-
some shipment of coin by using paper instruments such as bills of 
exchange. That bills of exchange did not always suffice to pay armies 
abroad helps explain why accumulating bullion often obsessed the 
French kings. For them it was a strategic good, a weapon essential 
for war.21 
The difficulties the Crown encountered in assessing wealth and 
in moving money from place to place help explain the fisc 's predilec-
tion for farming out the indirect taxes. Confiding the indirect taxes 
to a centralized bureaucracy would have raised horrendous problems, 
given the diversity and dispersion of French trade and the widespread 
exemptions. Each local office would have been obliged to levy taxes 
on different items, at different rates, and on trade that fluctuated 
wildly. The task would have been far more daunting than collecting 
the taille, for year in and year out the taille struck the same resource, 
the comparatively stolid revenues from land. The complexities and 
uncertainties are perhaps one reason why the rights to collect the in-
direct taxes were generally auctioned off. The auctions attracted the 
individuals who knew best how to collect a particular tax and got 
them to reveal what the tax was worth. The tax farmers who bought 
the auctioned rights also helped make disbursements, by paying sal-
aries or covering assignations with the money they had gathered.u 
The final and most serious dilemma the king faced-one that mer-
its detailed attention because of its political consequences-was the 
necessity of borrowing. War, as we shall see, inflated the king's ex-
penses grotesquely, while the ravages of fighting depressed the econ-
omy and caused tax revenues to fall . The solution was to borrow, but 
the Crown remained a notoriously poor credit risk. The king repeat-
edly broke his agreements with lenders, particularly when the im-
mediate needs of war pushed him to desperation; only when it was in 
his "interest to do so," as one historian has observed, were his prom-
ises to his creditors kept. The king might conclude a contract with 
one of the traitants, who furnished him with short term loans, and 
then break it almost before the ink was dry. Or he could engage in 
something far worse-full scale default and debt repudiation. Lenders 
were therefore loath to extend him credit, except on the dearest of 
terms. "The king," as Colbert said, "has no credit; one deals with 
him only with the expectation that he is to go bankrupt." 23 
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In the sixteenth century, it is true, the monarchy did briefly seem 
to have fashioned the beginnings of a system of public credit. In 
1522 the Crown gained access to long term credit by having the city 
government of Paris issue perpetual annuities (rentes SUI l'h6tel de 
ville) backed by royal tax revenues that the Crown placed under the 
city's control. Having the city government administer the annuities 
reassured the rente holders, who would have hesitated to lend to the 
king directly. The rente holders-most of them Parisians-knew that 
the city and its powerful allies in the Parlement of Paris would pro-
tect their interests. The city served as a financial intermediary for the 
issue of rentes again in 1536, and the same reassuring practice was 
soon regularized and swiftly extended to other cities, among them 
Lyon, at the time the financial capital of France. There the Crown also 
managed to tap the vibrant short-term commercial money market 
of the local fairs by borrowing regularly from a syndicate of bankers 
known as the grand parti. 
But the king could not be trusted. In Lyon the Crown defaulted 
on its debts, seized tax revenues that it had pledged for short- and 
for long-term credit, and employed force to extort loans from city 
councilors. The grand parti collapsed with a bankruptcy in 1558, and 
afterwards the only money that Lyon advanced came from personal 
loans that city councilors contracted, often under duress. In Paris, the 
rentes SUI ]'hotel de ville also degenerated into forced loans. By the 
end of the sixteenth century, public credit had largely disappeared, 
and the monarchy was reduced to the medieval practice of having the 
king's councilors take out loans in their own name.24 
Thereafter lending to the king continued to be risky. Default by 
the Crown was common, usually punctuated by the establishment of 
an extraordinary royal tribunal-a cbambre de ;ustice-to threaten 
lenders and frighten them into renegotiating loans. One can count at 
least fourteen chambres de ;ustice in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and 
eighteenth centuries. The members of the cbambres de ;ustice were 
handpicked by the Crown, and at least in theory they had the power 
to send financiers to the gallows. Although death penalties were ex-
tremely rare (usually the cbambre de ;ustice did nothing more than 
impose fines, after which the king declared an amnesty so as not 
to frighten away lenders), the losses from defaults, late payments, 
and renegotiated loans drove many a financier into bankruptcy.25 It is 
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hardly surprising, then, that the Crown had to pay enormous interest 
rates to attract lenders, at least in moments of crisis when the risk 
of default ran high. During the difficult years of the 1640s and 1650s, 
for example, the Crown paid 10, 15, or even 25 percent interest, at a 
time when private parties borrowed at about 6 percent.26 
Tax farming and the sale of government offices, which survived 
longer in France than in England, provided the government with ex-
pedients to attract wary lenders; as a result, much of the monarchy's 
credit was advanced by tax farmers and office holders. The tax farmers 
loaned money to the Crown and then arranged for repayment out of 
the taxes they collected. Their tax farms protected them (at least to a 
certain degree) from a government default because they had a fairly 
secure claim to government revenue: after all, the taxes they took in 
were in their hands, not in the king's. Moreover, the Crown might 
hesitate before defaulting on their loans because it would have to go 
to the trouble of installing new tax collectors. In a sense, their tax 
farms served as collateral for their loans.27 
Selling a government office, which amounted to a loan by the 
office purchaser, protected the lender in much the same way, for he 
had a prior claim on the revenues and other benefits attached to the 
office. The benefits could include not just the revenues of the office, 
but power, honor, tax exemptions, and other privileges. By the late 
seventeenth century, government borrowing via the sale of offices 
was highly developed; and it had transformed the office holders into 
financial intermediaries, who provided the government with a lim-
ited but relatively cheap source of long-term loans. Under law, offices 
were deemed real property, and prospective purchasers could borrow 
from private parties to acquire an office, using its value as collat-
eral. The government apparatus that administered the system-the 
parties casuelles-kept track of the title to each office and of the liens 
by the private lenders who had financed its purchase. The private 
lenders could sue the office holder if their loan was not paid; and like 
the holder of a modern mortgage, they were assured of a first claim 
on the value of the office. Since they did not have to worry about 
the office holder's other financial dealings and since the value of the 
office that backed their loan was readily ascertained, they were will-
ing to advance money to purchase offices at market rates of interest. 
And since the office holder himself could readily finance his office 
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at market rates, and since his liability in the affair was essentially 
limited to the value of the office itself, he would demand less of a pre-
mium in the form of the benefits and revenues attached to the office. 
The result was that the government could raise private capital at 
relatively low cost, particularly since some of the benefits accorded 
office holders-power, tax exemptions, and other privileges-were 
non-pecuniary.28 
The Crown could also borrow from existing office holders by 
promising increased revenues in return for an additional loan. The 
value of the offices involved would then rise; and by using the in-
creased value of the posts as collateral, the office holders could raise 
capital privately to finance the sum they advanced to the Crown. In 
the first half of the seventeenth century, it is true, such transactions 
frequently masked forced loans extorted from the office holders, but 
by the eighteenth century the process was usually voluntary. It began 
with negotiations between the Crown and an organized corporation 
of existing office holders-negotiations conducted efficiently with 
an agent of the office holders' corporation-and it concluded with an 
agreement that had to be approved by a majority vote of the mem-
bers of the corporation. The whole system made it more difficult for 
the king to default on the payments due the officer holders. Not only 
did they have a prior claim on the benefits of the office, but tamper-
ing with the payments due them could provoke the ire of powerful, 
organized corporations.29 
None of these devices, of course, afforded perfect protection to 
those who advanced money to the Crown. The king repudiated agree-
ments with tax farmers, and he withheld payments to office holders 
as well. These expedients and others like them did not eliminate all 
the dangers of lending to the Crown, nor did they permit the Crown 
to do all of its borrowing at private market rates: the king continued 
to pay a substantial premium on many of his debts, at least during 
times of crisis. The expedients did, however, attract lenders to do 
business with a horribly unreliable client. That the king resorted to 
such practices was thus understandable, and we can see why he did 
not simply sweep them away, even though in the long run they ate 
away at his power. The sale of offices, after all, cost the king control 
over officials and encouraged the granting of privileges and immuni-
ties to corporations of office holders. So did loans made by existing 
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office holders. So too did yet another fiscal expedient: having a cor-
porate body like the Estates of Languedoc use its good credit rating 
to borrow for the Crown. When the corporate body borrowed for the 
Crown voluntarily, it usually received something in return, such as 
stronger privileges or discretion over some of the king's revenue.30 
The loss of power that such corporate borrowing or the sale of offices 
entailed might be a small price to pay, though, if it permitted the 
king to raise cash in a moment of crisis. 
Here the theoretically minded reader might wonder why the king 
did not sell more offices and thereby dilute the office holders' share 
of power. Or why not aggressively play one group of officers against 
another to achieve the same goal? Either maneuver would eliminate 
obstructive officials, and the monarchy was certainly not above stoop-
ing to such tactics-indeed, it employed them before and during the 
revolt known as the Fronde. The problem was that it could not push 
such tactics too far. Multiplying the number of offices or unleashing 
cutthroat battles among the holders would eventually diminish the 
value of the offices that served as collateral for the king's loans. Not 
only would the king lose the backing of officials whose support he 
needed but he would reduce his ability to borrow. Perhaps that is one 
reason why Louis XIV took steps to limit access to the elite: ulti-
mately it strengthened the fisc.31 
Exactly how much money the French fiscal system put at the 
king's disposal is nearly impossible to say; the system was so riddled 
with privileges, corporate influence, and other peculiarities that it 
condemns to futility any effort to determine the Crown's spendable 
income precisely. In the first place, we generally do not know what 
funds lay under the control of the king and what belonged to privi-
leged elites.32 Worse, the tax figures we do have-numbers gathered 
in the first half of the eighteenth century by Jean-Roland Mallet 
and Fran!(Ois Forbonnais-are by and large incomplete. They are de-
rived from the archives of the central treasury, and unfortunately 
the central treasury did not record everything the government col-
lected. The treasury accounts omitted from tax receipts large sums 
that were spent locally on assessment and collection costs, salaries 
and military expenses, and certain disbursements and assignations. 
The amounts excluded loomed large in the budget, and in some in-
stances the feeble receipts in the treasury documents formed only a 
fourth of what was actually collected.33 
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One might assume that the central treasury numbers represented 
the fraction of tax receipts under the king's control-the king's 
spendable income. Nothing, though, could be more misleading. The 
sums missing from the treasury accounts included royal surtaxes 
hidden under the rubric of collection costs, large payments to royal 
troops posted in or traveling through the provinces, and politi-
cally sensitive disbursements that the king wanted paid secretly-all 
clearly items under royal control. The expense figures in the cen-
tral treasury accounts are equally misleading. And the fact that the 
accounts mix in a bewildering fashion both tax receipts and money 
advanced in the form of loans only compounds the difficulty, par-
ticularly during times of crisis, when taxes fell into arrears and loans 
mounted.34 
The best we can do is to construct a series of guesses, beginning 
with the central treasury figures (Table l ). Given their shortcomings, 
all we can hope is that they yield a trend. Although they cannot 
reveal the precise level of tax receipts or of the king's spendable in-
come, we might reasonably expect them to run roughly parallel to 
the king's income. The figures themselves are fairly certain, at least 
after about 16001 and the trend stands out fairly clearly for the seven-
teenth century. If we· convert the monetary figures to a commodity 
such as wheat or to man-days of labor, then we see that both real tax 
revenue and real per-capita taxes rose abruptly in the 1630s, receded 
slightly in the l66os, climbed again during the wars of Louis XIV's 
reign, and then reached even higher levels in the eighteenth century. 
It would be reasonable to assume that the king's spendable income 
did the same.35 
To overcome the limitations of the central treasury records, we 
can use some rough estimates assembled by James Collins for the 
period up to 1640 !see Table 2). His figures attempt to account for 
revenue that was spent locally and that never appeared in the cen-
tral treasury records. They concern regular taxes only (here meaning 
traditional direct and indirect taxes), and hence they exclude a bewil-
dering variety of expedients that the monarchy resorted to in times 
of crisis, particularly during the 1630s and 1640s. The expedients, 
ranging from forced loans and temporary taxes on officers to every 
imaginable sort of borrowing, raised, at least temporarily, the money 
at the Crown's disposal; and since they permitted France to wage war 
against the Habsburgs, their importance cannot be denied. But ulti-
TABLE I 
Cen tral Treasury Receipts, 1560s to I?8os 
Average Per Per Per 
annual capita capita capita 
receipts Grain Labor receipts grain labor 
Decade nominal* equiv.h equiv.' nominald equiv.' equiv.1 
1560/ 69 10.22 2.56 33.83 0.63 0.16 2.10 
1570/79 20.97 3.73 42.81 1.29 0.23 2.64 
1580/ 89 30.39 4.43 54.70 1.88 0.27 3.39 
1590/99 21.26 2.04 41.34 1.30 0.13 2.53 
1600/09 24.30 3.94 48.97 1.53 0.24 3.00 
1610/ 19 30.68 4.63 48.58 1.71 0.26 2.72 
1620/29 43.11 5.07 74.80 2.41 0.28 4. 18 
1630/39 92.35 10.48 153.92 5.16 0.59 8.60 
1640/ 49 114.98 11.15 159.06 6.58 0.64 9.11 
1650/59 126.86 10.53 154.11 7.26 0.60 8.83 
1660/69 91.72 8.63 107.86 5.00 0 .47 5.87 
1670/79 108.95 13.57 139.21 5.25 0.65 6.71 
1680/89 119.28 13.83 155.32 5.52 0.64 7.19 
1690/ 99 145.83 12.62 184.82 7.25 0.63 9.19 
1700/ 09 117.99 11.42 142.28 5.87 0.57 7.08 
1710/ 19 130.82 10.48 147.65 6.19 0.50 6.99 
1720/29 197.18 15.18 201.92 9.29 0.72 9.51 
1730/ 39 213.00 19.78 234.57 9.50 0.88 10.46 
1740/ 49 289.39 24.97 302.69 12.45 1.07 13.02 
1750/ 59 273.38 22.59 262.31 11.34 0.94 10.88 
1760/ 69 343.80 25.83 331.82 13.53 1.02 13.05 
1770 /79 362.00 2 1.62 320.27 13.72 0.82 12.14 
1780/89 421.50 29.50 328.71 15.46 1.08 12.06 
SOURC ES: Central Treasury receipts for the 1560s, 1580s, 166os-171os, and 1770s come from 
Philip T. Hoffman, "Taxes and Agraiian Life in Eaily Modern France: Land Sales, 1550- 1730," /EH 
46 (1986): 46-47. Receipts for the period 1590-1659 come from Fran~oise Bayaid, Le m onde des 
financiers au XVlle siecle, (Paiis, 1988), 29, supplemented by the figures in Richaid Bonney, The 
King's Debts, (Oxford, 1981), 304-5, when Bayaid's figures for a yeai were lacking. Figures for the 
1570s average those given by Hoffman and Bayaid. Figures for the 1720s average those given by 
Hoffman and those in James C. Riley, " French Finances, 1727-1768," fMH 59 (1987): 209-43. The 
figures for the period 1730-69 come from Riley and those from the 1780s from Peter Mathias 
and Patrick O'Brien, "Taxarion in Britain and France, 1715-1810," fEEcH 5 (1976): 601-50. Popula-
tion figures were derived from Jacques Dupaquier, ed., His toire de la population francaise, 4 vols. 
(Paris, 1988), 1:513-24, 2:64-68. Where Dupaquier gives low and high figures, I averaged the two 
and to correct Dupaquier 's numbers for the size and contemporary frontiers (Dupaquier assumes 
fixed modern frontiers) I used evidence on the aiea of France in Roland Mousnier, The Institu-
tions of France Under the Absolute Monarchy, i 589-q89, trans. Arthur GoldhaIDIDer and Brian 
Pearce, 2 vols. (Chicago, 1979-84), l : 682-86. The wheat equivalents were figured using a nine-
year moving average of Paris wheat prices centered on the year in question; the wheat prices come 
from Micheline Baulant, "Les prix des grains it Paris de r431 it 1788," Anna/es 23 (1968): 520-40. 
Labor equivalents were calculated using daily wages for unskilled Parisian laborers in Micheline 
Baulant, "Les salaires des ouvriers du bii.timent a Paris de 1400 a 1726," Anna/es 26 ( 1971): 463-83. 
• Millions of livres. d Livres. 
b Millions of hecto!iters of wheat. ' Hectoliters of wheat. 
' Millions of man-days. 1 Man-days. 
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TABLE 2 
Gross Regular Tax Revenue, 1364-1640 
Grain Labor 
equiv. equiv. 
Direct Total of total of total 
Period taxes ' taxes' taxesb taxes< 
Charles Y ( 1364-80) 2.0 
Charles VI ( 1380-1422) 0.6-1.4 2.0 16.0 
Charles VII ( 1422-61 ) 0.6-1.4 1.8-2.3 2.3-2.9 12.4-15.8 
Louis XI {1461-83) 
Maximum for reign, in 1483 4.4 4.7 7.3 37.6 
After reign 2.1 2.5 
(1487) (1484) 
Francis I ( 1515-4 7) 
Ca. 1523 4.8 8d 6.5 53.3 
Avg. for reign 8-10 5.0-6.2 48.0-60.I 
1549 6.6 8-9d 3.1-3.5 40.0-45.0 
1581 7.3 31.6' 6.8 57.5 
1607 17.9 30.4 5.0 60.8 
1620 19.2 33.7 4.9 56.2 
1634 38.9 63.2 7.5 105.3 
1640 44.l 77.8 9.2 103.7 
SOURCES: Tax figures come from James Collins, Fiscal Limits of Absolutism: Direct Taxation 
in Early Seventeentb-Century France \Berkeley, 1983), 48-55, 233-36. Grain equivalents and labor 
equivalents were calculated using figures in Micheline Baulant, "Les salaires des ouvriers du bati-
ment a P:uis de 1400 a 1726," Annales 26 \1971): 463-83 and "Les prix des grains ii Paris de 1431 a 
1788," Anna/es 23 \1968): 520-40. 
NOTE: Regul:u taxation includes direct caxes, salt caxes, sale caxes, and transit taxes. Although 
the figures attempt to include sums levied and spent locally, cenain local ch:uges are omitted. For 
details, see Collins, Fiscal Limits of Absolutism, 48-55, 233-36. For each year of the table, the grain 
and labor equivalents were calculated by using the median of the average 3Illlual prices tor wages) 
for a nine-year period centered on the year in question. For the reigns of Ch:ules VI, Charles VU, 
and Francis I (average for reign) the calculation used the following ye:us: 1402, 1442, and 1531. 
Wages here :ue for unskilled labor and do not reflect the cost of skilled labor such as soldiers. 
• Millions of livres. ' Millions of man·days. 
b Millions of hectolitres. d Certain taxes excluded. 
' Includes loans and irregular tax revenue in addition to regular caxation; certain levies for 
local ch:uges omitted. 
mately it was the regular tax revenue, not the expedients, that defined 
the revenues at the monarch's disposal.36 
Along with local tax series, Collins's estimates let us push the 
evolution of French taxes back into the fourteenth century. Once 
converted into grain or labor equivalents, his estimates confirm that 
real taxes shot up in the 1630s. They perhaps disclose an earlier in-
crease as well, between the reigns of Louis XI and Francis I, although 
the size and durability of this increase depend on whether one pre-
fers the labor or grain equivalents. Local tax records paint the same 
picture: spiraling real taxation in the seventeenth century, and per-
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haps in the late fifteenth or early sixteenth century as well. And the 
local series stretch back far enough to reveal the very first revolution 
in real tax levels: the jump that accompanied the initial imposition 
of permanent taxation during the Hundred Years War.37 
< II > 
The Role of Representative Institutions 
The role that representative bodies played in providing and spending 
French taxes changed considerably during the early modern period. 
In the late fourteenth century, they seemed condemned to insignifi-
cance. This was true in particular of the Estates General, which had 
lost a magnificent opportunity to have a voice in taxation by the 
1360s. Summoned thereafter at the king's will-and only when the 
Crown was weak-the Estates General would never become a regular 
organ of government and never exercise control over the purse. While 
in England the Parliament was convening better than three years out 
of four between 1327 and 1485, in France the Estates General did not 
meet even one year out of five during the same period, and there-
after their meetings became even more sporadic. The English Parlia-
ment meanwhile had become the arena for negotiation over taxes; in 
France, what negotiation there was took place in provincial estates 
and local assemblies, bypassing the Estates General altogether.38 
The Estates General never wielded true legislative powers either. 
Although they influenced royal legislation through petitions and re-
monstrances, their role remained advisory, for it was the king who 
made the law and he was under no obligation to heed the opinion of 
the Estates. And even when the Estates General tried to assert them-
selves, the Crown easily overcame them by pitting off one interest 
against another or by ignoring their requests once they had been dis-
solved. At the Estates General of Tours in 14841 for example, it was 
suggested that all parts of France have provincial estates with rights 
to consent to taxation. The Crown persuaded deputies from regions 
that already had provincial estates not to support the proposal, and 
it was dropped from the cahier of remonstrances.39 The same Estates 
General also asked for regular meetings of their body every two years 
to deliberate over taxation. The king's chancellor accepted the re-
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quest; but once the Estates were dissolved, the Crown went on levy-
ing taxes without ever calling back the Estates. The Crown even 
managed to get a vote in favor of dissolution by pitting region against 
region in negotiations over regional tax shares.40 
Like the Estates General, the provincial estates also fell into de-
cline in the late fourteenth century. Even under a weak king-such 
as the mad Charles VI-the monarchy was able to tax without their 
consent, largely because important provincial elites (the nobility, gov-
ernment officers, influential city dwellers) had been bought off with 
exemptions and a share of royal tax revenues. What did they care if 
the local peasants and artisans shouldered the burden? 41 
Beginning about 1420, though, the provincial estates experienced 
a revival. In much of France they met more frequently, gained royal 
recognition for their right to consent to taxation, and developed a per-
manent corps of officials who assessed and levied the taxes they had 
approved. A few of them faltered, but by the late sixteenth century 
provincial estates voted taxation in over half the country. Their re-
vival reflected, at least in part, the royal strategy of confirming lqcal 
privileges in order to yoke provinces to the Crown. What better way 
was there to bind a region and its elites to the Crown than to con-
firm their right to assemble, to present remonstrances, and to con-
sent to taxation? The provincial estates also facilitated the task of 
negotiation between the Crown and the local elites. And finally, the 
Crown came to rely upon them to assess and to collect local taxes-
a task that we know was both difficult and costly in France. While a 
region with strong provincial estates-Languedoc for example-es-
caped with a somewhat lower tax burden thanks to the protection 
they afforded, the king had less difficulty assessing, collecting, and 
predicting his tax revenue when the estates were in charge.42 
In the seventeenth century, the balance of power between the 
king and the provincial estates shifted in the king's favor . The change 
was particularly marked under Louis XIV. The Crown now had more 
agents to collect taxes and to enforce the royal will than it did in 
the sixteenth century.43 More important, it could distribute greater 
resources in order to make the provincial estates bend to the mon-
arch's will. If the provincial estates resisted, if they hesitated to grant 
the king's will or failed to meet his demands in their entirety, the 
Crown could react summarily. It is. thus not surprising that in the 
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seventeenth century the monarchy suppressed-or simply failed to 
summon-estates it considered dilatory or obstructive, so that by 
1700 the area where the provincial estates voted taxes had fallen to 
only 30 percent of France.44 
More frequently, however, the Crown resorted to rewards and 
to manipulation, methods that succeeded with even the strongest 
estates, such as those of Languedoc. Pensions, access to royal patron-
age, discretion over the spending of tax revenues, and outright brib-
ery from the abundant royal coffers were all used to win the assent of 
particular estates. If such measures failed, the Crown interfered with 
elections, packed assemblies, manipulated agendas, and excluded ob-
structive members in order to get its way. Loyal servants of the Crown 
presided over meetings of the estates and reported on recalcitrant 
deputies who failed to heed the royal will. By the late seventeenth 
century, the royal tactics had rendered the remaining estates com-
pletely docile. As John Locke noted during his travels through France, 
even the estates of Languedoc dared not refuse the king's demands 
for higher taxes.45 
« III ,... 
Coping with Fiscal Crises 
Although the king's expenses, like his tax revenues, are impossible to 
determine accurately, we know that the costs of war provoked nearly 
all of the tax increases and fiscal crises of early modem France. The 
-Hundred Years War gave birth to ermane axation in France; the 
Italian wars us ere in the tax increases under Francis I; and e wars 
of religion released a torrent of government debt. The Thirty Years 
War, the struggles against Spain, and the conflicts under Louis XIV 
caused the spiraling levies and the fiscal imbroglios of the seven-
teenth century. The reason was simple: armies ballooned in wartime, 
armies that had to be fed and outfitted. War required guns, horses, 
subsidies for allies, and increasingly costly defensive fortifications. 
The cost per soldier grew steadily and so did the size of the armies 
that had to be assembled. From a maximum of at most 12, 000 men 
when mobilized in the thirteenth century, the French forces could 
be stretched up to 50,000 men during wartime in the sixteenth cen-
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tury, up to 150,000 or more in the 1630s, and up to 400,000 late 
in Louis XIV's reign. Although precise figures are impossible to as-
semble, it is clear that military expenses grew as well, in order to pay 
for the soldiers, their supplies, and the ever more expensive weap-
onry and fortifications.46 
Taxes could not keep pace with the effort needed for mobiliza-
tion; indeed, indirect taxes were likely to fall as war disturbed the 
economy.47 The only way to meet the rocketing expenses was to bor-
row. Every war thus brought in its wake a flood of red ink and frantic 
attempts to procure loans. On top of the military costs themselves 
were piled the crushing rates of interest that the Crown had to pay, 
and it was during the fiscal crises provoked by war that the Crown 
turned to its most desperate financial expedients, the ones with the 
most striking political consequences. 
The first half of the seventeenth century-the period from 
roughly the end of the Wars of Religion (1598) to the close of the war 
with Spain (1659)-witnessed several crises of this sort, crises with 
lasting political consequences. Throughout the period, the French 
fisc was racked by repeated difficulties, but three crises seem par-
ticularly revealing: the default on government rentes in 1602-4, the 
seizure of droits alienis in 1634, and the reduction of payments due 
rentiers and office holders in 1648. The first occurred as Henri IV 
sought to mend the fiscal ills brought on by the Wars of Religion. 
The king had emerged from the wars burdened with enormous debts. 
Even if we ignore the large annual payments he owed office holders 
(their gages, which provided them with a return on their investment), 
Henri IV's debt service still amounted to over II million livres per 
year in 1607, some 35 or 40 percent of his tax revenue.48 
To cope with the burden, Henri and his minister Sully undertook 
a number of reforms and repudiated part of the government debt by 
defaulting on a portion of the government rentes in the years 1602-
4. Typically, the rentes were held by officers, who had to swallow the 
reduced return on them and the concomitant loss of capital. To pla-
cate them, and for other purposes as well, the monarchy granted the 
officers a considerable boon: absolute heredity for the offices they 
owned. In 1604 Henri removed the legal risks that hindered the trans-
fer of offices and gave the officers the right to bequeath their posts to 
their heirs in return for the payment of an annual fee, the so-called 
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paulette. Although their rentes had declined in value, they gained 
more secure title to their government posts, and the market value of 
their offices surged. 
As for the Crown, not only did it placate the officers but it could 
now sell new offices at inflated prices-or in other words, borrow 
at a much lower interest rate. The Crown thus had a further reason 
to favor the paulette, its effect upon borrowing. Its consequences for 
patronage were probably appealing too, for it would undercut the con-
trol that the great noble families exercised over government posts. 
One may of course debate the relative importance of the various mo-
tives behind the paulette, as historians have, but it is clear that it was 
at least in part a fiscal expedient designed both to mollify the influen-
tial victims of a recent bankruptcy and to facilitate future borrowing. 
The price of the expedient was of course political, as contemporaries 
recognized. In the long run the paulette reinforced the autonomy of 
yet another privileged group and weakened the king's hold on what 
should have been his loyal agents.49 
In the 1630s, a fiscal crisis again drove the monarchy toward ex-
pedients with lasting political consequences. Here the occasion was 
France's entry into the Thirty Years War. As French involvement 
grew, as the kingdom struggled against encirclement by the Habs-
burgs, the Crown sold not only hundreds of offices but also large 
numbers of d.roits alienes, the rights to collect hefty new surtaxes, 
which sometimes dwarfed the taille itself. The sale of droits alienes, 
which were usually purchased by the very financial officers who as-
sessed and collected the surtaxes, was yet another form of govern-
ment loan. Even these fiscal devices, though, did not make ends 
meet, and in 1634 the Crown went through what amounted to a par-
tial bankruptcy: it confiscated the rights to the surtaxes (the surtaxes 
themselves were of course not abolished) and paid off the owners 
with rentes of lower value. The partial bankruptcy was a last-ditch 
expedient that saved the king 15 million livres a year in debt ser-
vice, but it enraged the financial officers. Infuriated, they abetted tax 
revolts, blocked the collection of the 'surtaxes, or made no levies at 
all, thereby aiding the numerous peasants who beginning in the late 
1630s simply refused to pay taxes.50 
The monarchy's response was to dispatch the intendants, who 
took over the local tax system and deployed special military brigades 
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to gather back taxes. The soldiers, though, who might better have 
been employed in the armies fighting the king's foreign wars, cost 
more than they collected. They devastated the villages they occupied 
and kept whatever money they seized for themselves. Clearly, the 
monarchy could not do without the financial officers' cooperation: it 
could not perform the difficult task of assessing and collecting taxes 
without their help. The Crown needed trustworthy tax agents but 
found itself instead at the mercy of yet another privileged group. Not 
until much later, on the eve of Colbert's fiscal reforms, did the in-
tendants begin to work side by side with the financial officers. Only 
then did tax collection proceed smoothly.51 
Admittedly, the monarchy had other reasons to send the inten-
dants to the provinces: the decision to do so did not merely result 
from the bankruptcy of 1634. They were needed to suppress tax re-
volts, reform th~ army, and prevent the conspiracies fomented, so 
Richelieu feared, by France's foreign enemies. Nor should one exag-
gerate the importance of confiscating the droits alienes in 1634. The 
financial officers-and office holders in general-had other griev-
ances beyond the loss of their droits alienes, and the crisis in 1634 
was only the beginning of the chronic fiscal difficulties that plagued 
France throughout her involvement in the Thirty Years War. Still, the 
crisis was undeniably one of the factors that brought about the sys-
tem of provincial intendants, a hallmark of Old Regime governance 
in France.52 
In 1648 fiscal expedients once again provoked political upheaval, 
when they helped trigger the Fronde. The grievances that caused the 
revolt were complex, but prominent among them, at least at the out-
set, were the exactions the Crown had recourse to in its desperate 
attempt to fund the continuing war against the Habsburgs in the Em-
pire and in Spain. To demonstrate to the Spanish negotiators that the 
French had the will to continue the war, the Crown borrowed heavily. 
By 1648 it had already anticipated tax revenues due in 1650 and 1651, 
and it was resorting to even more dire expedients. It diverted taxes 
earmarked for payments due on existing debt and used the revenue 
thus released to pay for new loans, contracted, at understandably high 
interest rates, from financiers. Among the payments cut were those 
due the owners of government offices and the holders of government 
rentes.53 
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The victims of this partial default included the magistrates of the 
sovereign law courts. Income from their offices had suffered severely; 
so had their investments in rentes. They were further outraged by 
a delay in the renewal of the paulette. Infuriated, the judges of the 
Paris Parlement refused to register new fiscal edicts; the Crown had 
to force them to do so, in a ceremony in which one of the magis-
trates, Omer Talon, declared that forced registration was improper 
and that the magistrates ought to be able vote freely on registration 
without royal interference. In the aftermath, the sovereign courts in 
Paris united in a joint assembly and demanded a program of reforms 
that included withdrawal of the royal intendants, financial reform, 
payment of sums due on rentes and offices, and the right to deliber-
ate on financial edicts freely and without royal coercion.54 
The Fronde raged on until 1653, enlisting the angry opposition of 
numerous social groups but never provoking any constitutional re-
organization. Ultimately, the magistrates of Parlement retreated in 
horror when the Fronde veered toward fundamental change, and the 
interests arrayed against the Crown were in any case too diverse to 
effect a redefinition of the king's role. The precise course of these 
events need not detain us here; what is worth noting, though, is the 
way the Crown acted in the aftermath of the Fronde. Throughout 
the 1650s, when Mazarin was prime minister, the Crown feared that 
tampering with the rentes and the offices would rekindle the Fronde. 
Unfortunately, France remained at war with Spain until 1659, and 
the cost of the fighting forced the Crown to curtail payments due on 
rentes in the late 1650s. The Parlement of Paris again reacted, but 
this time the Crown managed to appease the magistrates of the Parle-
ment by assuring that the rentes they held were paid. Giving priority 
in the payment of rentes to the magistrates split them from the other 
rente holders and prevented them from uniting with other opponents 
of the Crown in a reenactment of the Fronde.55 
The same sensitivity to the political consequences of default per-
sisted in the l66os, when Mazarin was dead and Louis XIV had 
begun his personal rule. Writing in 1663, Colbert worried that rentes 
had fallen into the hands of magistrates from the sovereign courts 
and other politically influential persons. Such organized individuals 
could easily react to protect their interests; and Colbert found the 
situation so threatening that he urged a thorough overhaul of gov-
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ernment credit, lest the monarchy and its policies fall hostages to 
influential creditors.56 
During each of these seventeenth-century crises, the Crown's re-
actions fit a clear pattern. In each instance, the costs of warfare ne-
cessitated fiscal expedients, typically including some sort of default. 
But the expedients then unleashed surprising political consequences, 
whether the Crown tried to appease the debt holders or merely coped 
with their anger. The needs of the moment-what economists might 
call the ruler's high discount rate-undoubtedly justified default-
ing on the rentes in 1602- 4, seizing the droits alienes in 1634, and 
cutting payments due rentiers and office holders in 1648. But the 
political consequences were considerable and not always predictable: 
the paulette, the intendants, the Fronde, and an enduring concern 
with the sensitive politics of government debt. If such seventeenth-
century examples do not suffice, one only has to consider the deci-
sion to call the Estates General in 1789. 
The long-run effect that wars and fiscal crises had on representa-
tive institutions, on the other hand, is more complex. Consider, for 
example, the Hundred Years War. After initially helping to advance 
the cause of the estates, it ushered in a long period of taxation with-
out consent. Then, in the latter stages of the war, the Crown found 
it in its interest to negotiate with local assemblies, and the provin-
cial estates revived. They gave the king an effective forum for dealing 
with local elites, particularly in farflung provinces where the Crown's 
hold was weak, and in return for spoils and privileges they helped 
the king assemble his realm from the wreckage of the Hundred Years 
War. Well into the sixteenth century most of the provincial estates 
thrived in cooperation with the monarchy and assisted the feeble bu-
reaucracy in the fleecing of the common people. 
In the seventeenth century, however, the balance of power, as we 
saw above, turned in favor of the Crown. To wage war against the 
Habsburgs, the monarchy pushed taxes far higher, particularly in the 
1630s; and despite the tax revolts and the fiscal crises that repeatedly 
shook the country, the Crown in the end had greater resources at its 
disposal than ever before. It had larger armies, more servants, and 
larger sums of money to spend. The resources all served to reduce the 
provincial estates and other representative assemblies to docility. 
It is important to recall here that the provincial estates were not 
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crushed by force. By and large, the members of the estates were bribed 
and bought off, like other local notables throughout the realm. That 
the king no longer needed the provincial estates as organizations 
may well have reflected the fact that he could now use other chan-
nels to dispense spoils. The intendants were particularly effective at 
distributing the king's favors, and they could also conduct negotia-
tions between the Crown and local elites, supplanting the provincial 
estates in this role. The estates survived only where they were too 
deeply ingrained in local privileges to be uprooted or where they con-
tinued to aid the king in the difficult task of tax assessment and tax 
collection. But even where they persisted, they never developed true 
legislative powers and never formed a real forum for resistance to 
the Crown.57 
Given the weakened role of representative assemblies and the 
structure of governance in France, it is hardly surprising that by 
the seventeenth century French political thought did not necessarily 
resonate with the same language one heard across the Channel. 
Although Protestant and Catholic theorists in France had spoken of 
resistance to the Crown during the Wars of Religion, the experience 
of forty years of civil war created a powerful ar ment for a stron 
monarch and ushed French po "tical thought toward firmer em-
brace with absolutism y e awn of the seventeent century. By t e 
time of the Fronde, we can thus have a crisis in which the abundant 
pamphlet literature rarely raises fundamental constitutional issues, 
since nearly all authors agree on the need for a strong monarchy. The 
contrast with England, where pamphlets openly addressed constitu-
tional limits to the king's powers, is striking.58 
Not that the French considered themselves slaves. The most in-
fluential French political thinker of the late sixteenth century, Jean 
Bodin, pointed the way toward absolutism by subjecting custom-
ary law to the king's authority. But for Bodin, the king's subjects 
were "free." Because the king was to abide by the laws of nature, 
his subjects, so Bodin maintained, enjoyed natural liberty and were 
by no stretch of the imagination slaves. In much the same manner 
did Charles Loyseau, an important legal theorist of absolutism in 
the early seventeenth century, rule out any contradiction between 
a strong monarchy and personal liberty. In traditional Aristotelian 
fashion, Loyseau distinguished between absolute monarchy and des-
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potism and argued that a monarch would respect property and con-
tracts. For him and for most other French thinkers of the time, only a 
despot would violate personal liberty. Similar arguments were made 
even during moments of crisis. On the eve of the Fronde, when the 
magistrate Omer Talon declared his opposition to the forced regis-
tration of financial edicts, he acknowledged that the king was ac-
countable to no one. Yet he too distinguished the king's absolutism 
from despotism and asserted that the king's subjects-to the king's 
glory-were free and not slaves.59 
The problem with such an idea of freedom was that nothing 
backed it up. Bodin grounded his notion of the subject's freedom in 
a flimsy and highly theoretical notion of natural law, which the king 
was supposed to observe. Loyseau's guarantees of liberty were equally 
shaky. More telling than constitutional theory here, in a kingdom 
where theory was no guide to practice, was the reality of politics: 
in the seventeenth century there simply were no powerful counter-
vailing forces that could guarantee liberties for all of the kingdom. 
No central organization could negotiate with the Crown and speak, 
even in theory, for the entire realm. In particular, no governmen-
tal organ could protect the average subject's property from arbitrary 
taxation. The Estates General had long been in decline, no doubt be-
cause they were ill suited to negotiation in a country as vast and di-
verse as France. The provincial estates survived, but they cooperated 
with the Crown, enjoyed its privileges, and helped collect its taxes. It 
was therefore unlikely that they would consistently defend peasants 
and artisans against royal taxation, and in any case their interests 
never extended beyond their provinces. As for the magistrates in the 
sovereign law courts, their offices gave them a stake in the system, 
and they were easily bought off with specific favors. Like the provin-
cial estates, their interests tended to be narrow and particularistic. 
They might ask for a form of habeas corpus, as the sovereign courts 
in Paris did at the onset of the Fronde, but it would apply only to 
the magistrates themselves. Or in a provincial Parlement the magis-
trates might support resistance to the taille but not to the indirect 
taxes that provided the income due them from their offices.611 
In practice then liberty amounted to nothing more than privi-
lege, particularly when liberty meant securing property from arbi-
trary taxation. Without an Estates General or another broad organi-
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zation that could prevail against the Crown, "resistance to taxation," 
as Jean Meuvret said long ago, could "only rely upon the provin-
cial courts and estates; by that very fact the goal of tax resistance 
usually boiled down to the defense of particularistic privileges," and 
the "struggle for liberty" became little more than the protection of 
narrow advantage.61 The privileges in question here were often dis-
guised as medieval in origin, but as we have seen most were created 
by the early modem monarchy. As the monarchy pursued its fiscal 
and political goals, the privileges grew ever more tangled. It was never 
clear whether they were inalienable rights or revocable concessions, 
but what supported them was not constitutional theory but politi-
cal power. Indeed, privileges under the Old Regime were a form of 
property secure only when backed by power; and power, like liberty, 
came down to defense of privilege. 
Not that a more general notion of liberty was inconceivable. In 
1664 the Cour des Aides of Paris (a sovereign court that handled 
tax cases) ruled against taille collectors who had searched notarial 
records to see if a taxpayer was underassessed. In its ruling, the 
court denounced the audacity of such an action and claimed that it 
violated the "public liberty of Frenchmen." Yet despite the invoca-
tion of a general principle of public liberty, what outraged the court 
was something very specific: the investig_ation of notarial records. 
By revealing the true wealth of families, such investigations under-
mined tax exemptions for the elite and could be used to mount an 
attack on privilege. They thus violated an unwritten covenant of late 
seventeenth-century politics, which protected the elite's property 
and strengthened their privileges. In the sixteenth and early seven-
teenth centuries, the elite's property and privileges had not always 
merited such respect; but by the personal reign of Louis XIV, their 
property was safe from attack, and their privileges, though some-
times investigated, were thoroughly reinforced. If the concern shown 
by the Cour des Aides was therefore understandable, the court 's real 
fear was clearly the attack on privilege-the privilege of powerful 
elites. Even here "public liberty" masked something very narrow.62 
The peculiar nature of liberty in France thus reflected the struc-
ture of the French state in the early modem period: a shifting coali-
tion linking the Crown and various elites, who had given their alle-
giance to the monarchy in return for privileges and spoils. Long 
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unstable, the coalition hardened and closed in the late seventeenth 
century. Politics in Old Regime France was the pursuit of privilege 
and the settlement of arguments among the elites within this coali-
tion; but despite their frequent quarrels, the notables all agreed on the 
sovereignty of the Crown. Privileged and exempt from taxes, siphon-
ing off a share of the government's revenues, they had little reason to 
question or to fear the authority of the king. 
At the same time, the monarch's powers were hardly unlimited. 
The Crown depended on the privileged groups and could not survive 
without the allegiance of at least some of the notables. At various 
times it relied on the political support of the great magnates, the 
good will of the courts, or the credit of the financiers. And it always 
needed reliable agents to carry out its will-for example, the finan-
cial officers who collected taxes and advanced money. But the king's 
ultimate weakness was that he alone held the coalition togetner. 
No forum assembled his various supporters, and any decision that 
would require the elite's assent-for instance, the ending of fiscal 
exemptions and the imposition of taxes upon the privileged-would 
entangle the Crown in long and costly negotiations with each privi-
leged group. It is no wonder then that the question of fundamental 
tax reform, when finally raised, paralyzed the entire polity. 
The loss of freedom in the polity was born chiefly by those outside 
the realm of privilege, the peasants and artisans. The economy in par-
ticular suffered, since the property rights of those without influence 
were insecure and their taxes unpredictable. Privileges cut across the 
realm and could ensnarl any entrepreneurial undertaking-building 
a canal, creating a manufacture-in a thicket of litigation. The toll 
exacted on the economy awaits calculation, but at least in agricul-
ture and transportation there are signs that it dampened trade and 
discouraged investment. Other sectors of commerce suffered as well 
since so much effort was devoted to the pursuit of privilege, a pur-
suit of redistribution that produced absolutely nothing. Banking in 
particular seems to have suffered grievous harm. Long before John 
Law, the Crown's actions shattered a nascent financial network in 
sixteenth-century Lyon, but even more damaging in the long run was 
the insidious appeal of the fisc. State finance siphoned away talent 
and capital that might otherwise have been mobilized for productive 
investment within France.6.1 
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There remains, though, a paradox within the tax system of early 
modern France. Shaken by numerous crises, a drag on the French 
economy, it nonetheless managed to survive until ~t muddled 
through, and the fisc coughed up enough in taxes arutio"ans to fight 
war after war. Not that the tax system was fragile, as is sometimes 
supposed. What appeared to be fragility was merely the lack of hier-
archy and of centralization, since tax administration under the Old 
Regime was decentralized-farmed out, auctioned off, or left to the 
care of local officials. The decentralization was in a sense the strength 
of the tax system. But having weathered so many crises, why did it 
founder in 1789? What was different about the final crisis of the Old 
Regime? Perhaps it was the political paralysis that tax reform pro-
voked. 
<APPENDIX>--
The Cost of Government Borrowing 
What it cost the Crown to borrow is a complex subject and a forbidding one 
for the non-specialist. In the first place, at any given time, the interest rate 
varied greatly from loan to loan depending on the guarantees and the collat-
eral that the government offered. Interest rates on a given type of loan also 
varied over time, depending on the financial heal th of the monarchy and the 
prospects for repayment. In the late 1540s, for example, the Crown typically 
paid 4 percent per quarter for its short term debt at the Lyon fairs, whereas 
private merchants borrowed at only 2.5 to 3 percent per quarter. But the 
effective interest rate the government paid on this debt changed dramati-
cally in response to news of war, peace, or financial difficulty. Evidence for 
such dramatic changes can be found in the secondary market for the Lyon 
fair debt, in which prices varied inversely with the effective interest rate or 
return. A reassuring amortization plan pushed the government debt in Lyon 
to 101. 75 percent of its face value in 1555; the 1558 bankruptcy immediately 
drove it down to 70 percent of its face value and eventually to 38 percent of 
face value by 1564. The seventeenth century witnessed similar variations in 
the premium that the government had to pay lenders. Typically it was high 
during moments of crises, but it could come down during times of peace and 
when the finances were healthy. After Colbert righted government finances, 
for example, the monarchy's credit rating improved, so that by 1680 it con-
tracted some loans at the going private rate of 5 percent. In the eighteenth 
century war again drove government interest rates up above the market rate 
during moments of crisis.64 
